Molecular biologists exploit information conveyed by mechanistic models for experimental purposes. In this contribution, I make sense of this aspect of biological practice by developing Keller's idea of the distinction between 'models of' and 'models for'. 'Models of (phenomena)' should be understood as models representing phenomena and they are valuable if they explain phenomena. 'Models for (manipulating phenomena)' suggest new types of material manipulations and they are important not because of their explanatory force, but because of the interventionist strategies they afford. This is a distinction between aspects of the same model; in molecular biology, models may be treated either as 'models of' or as 'models for'. By analyzing the discovery and characterization of restriction-modification systems and their exploitation for DNA cloning and mapping, I identify the differences between treating a model as a 'model of' or as a 'model for'. These lie in a cognitive disposition of the modeler towards the model. A modeler will look at a model as a 'model of' if he/she is interested in its explanatory force, or as a 'model for' if the interest is in the material manipulations it can possibly afford.
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Introduction
Models can be used in many ways to achieve a number of different purposes (Morrison and Morgan [1999] ). For instance, models are used to draw inferences about a target system, as measuring instruments, as experimental systems (Morrison and Morgan [1999] , pp. 20-1), to explain, or to construct other models. In molecular biology, models are used not only as tools to shed light on phenomena or theories, but also to design new experimental strategies (Morange [1998] ). In Rheinberger's own words, 'molecular biology […] is governed by methods rooted in the molecular tools that operate in the living cell itself ' (2007, p. 220) . Here Rheinberger is implicitly saying that knowledge of tools operating in the living cell can provide solid grounds for biological experimental methods. Since knowledge in molecular biology is expressed mainly in the form of mechanistic models (Craver and Darden [2013] ), Rheinberger's claim can be interpreted as saying that molecular biologists take advantage of (or take inspiration from) mechanistic models to develop new experimental strategies. This aspect of mechanistic models has not been properly appreciated in philosophical studies of biology. Philosophy of biology has mainly focused on explanatory aspects of mechanistic models. To fill the gap in the literature, here I aim to understand the role that mechanistic models have in the development of experimental strategies. In particular, the question I am interested in is:
What is the relation between mechanistic models and experimental strategies in molecular biology? I will answer this question by borrowing and developing a distinction made by Evelyn Fox Keller. In ([2000] ), Keller discusses the relation between theory and practice in biology and she mentions a distinction between 'models of' and 'models for'. 'Models of' (phenomena) should be understood as models representing phenomena, while 'models for' (manipulating phenomena) are models that suggest new types of material manipulations, in the sense of tools for material change. In Keller's terms, 'models of' are theoretical in the sense that they are aimed at explaining accurately specific aspects of biological phenomena, while 'models for' are valuable not because they represent accurately or explain phenomena (though they might), but because they suggest strategies for manipulating phenomena. In my understanding, this distinction is not between two types of models; rather it is between different aspects of models, especially in molecular biology, where mechanistic models might explain but they might also suggest new interventionist strategies. However, only a few mechanistic models in molecular biology have been directly involved in the development of experimental strategies. Therefore, certain mechanistic models must possess virtues that make them better 'models for' rather than simply 'models of'. In this article I want to understand in virtue of what models may be a good 'models for'.
The structure of this article is as follows. In Section 2, I will introduce the received view on 'models of' in molecular biology (2.1) and some preliminary considerations on why we should distinguish them from 'models for' (2.2, 2.3, 2.4). In Section 3, I will discuss more in detail 'models for' by reconstructing the history of the development of the model of the restriction-modification systems which embeds important aspects of 'models for'. The main thesis is that whether a 'model' counts as a 'model of' or a 'model for' depends on a cognitive disposition of the modeler towards the model. A modeler will look at a model as a 'model of' if he/she is interested in its explanatory force, or as a 'model for' if the interest lies in the material manipulations it affords. In section 4, I will distinguish two cognitive dispositions behind 'models of' and 'models for', namely an epistemic disposition and a disposition towards affordances.
Such dispositions 'prescribe' the way the model will be treated, developed, and evaluated. In other words, these cognitive dispositions 'prescribe' the virtues that modelers usually look for in a model. In section 5, I will identify 'portability' as a complex and fundamental virtue of 'models for'.
'Models of' and 'Models for' in Molecular Biology
Although the distinction between 'models of' and 'models for' captures important aspects of models in molecular biology, philosophy of biology has mainly focused on models considered under the (epistemic) aspects of 'models of'.
One may object that in philosophy of biology the relation between mechanistic models and interventionist/manipulative strategies has been extensively analyzed.
However, in these cases philosophers have focused on material manipulations with explanatory or realist issues in mind, rather than being concerned about what models in molecular biology allow us to do independently of these epistemic issues. Let me introduce more precisely the distinction.
'Models of' in molecular biology
The aim of molecular biology is to explain biological phenomena (for instance protein synthesis, cell cycle, and so on) in light of macromolecules (like nucleotides and amino acids) that compose it. In philosophy of biology, the received view (Tabery et al [2015] ) assumes that the unit of explanation of molecular biology is the mechanistic model (Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2005] ), namely a description of how biological components are organized in order to produce a specific biological phenomenon (Machamer et al [2000] ). The more a mechanistic model (or a description) can depict precisely the way macromolecules are organized to fully account for the phenomenon, the more the biological phenomenon is explained. This view is also endorsed by prominent molecular biologists (Weinberg [1985] ; Alberts [2012] ). Therefore, models of phenomena -in the sense of accurate representations of phenomena -play a crucial explanatory role in molecular biology. Consider for instance the model of CRISPR-Cas system (Figure 1 ).
The CRISPR-Cas system is the immune system of specific bacteria and archaea (Hille and Charpentier [2016] ). The CRISPR-Cas9 model was originally conceived as a 'model of'; the target system (CRISPR-Cas9 system) of the model was studied by microbiologists in order to explain the functioning of such a system (Zhang [2015] , p. 409). This immune system works as follows (I draw extensively from (Makarova et al [2015] )). A CRISPR locus consists of a CRISPR array ('Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats') -namely a series of nucleotide repeats-separated by short variable DNA sequences called 'spacers'. Such spacers are composed by integrated foreign DNA sequences. The CRISPR array is flanked by several cas genes (Cas stands for 'CRISPR-associated'). The mechanism of CRISPR-Cas is composed of three main stages. The first stage has been called adaptation, when fragments of foreign DNA from invading viruses are incorporated into the CRISPR array as new 'spacers'. These provide the sequence memory for a targeted defence against subsequent invasions by the corresponding virus. The second stage is expression, namely when the CRISPR array is transcribed and matured to produce CRISPR RNAs (crRNAs). Finally, there is the interference. This is when crRNAs, aided by Cas proteins, function as guides to specifically target and cleave the nucleic acids of specific foreign viruses. Figure 1 provides the typical diagram used to represent such a mechanism. If mechanistic models explain, then the model of Figure 1 is seen as explanatory of how the immune system of certain bacteria and archaea works. This model describes how certain entities (DNA molecules, proteins) work together to produce a specific phenomenon. Describing and representing accurately the causal structure of a phenomenon is here explanatory of the phenomenon itself.
What is the meaning of 'accurate' here? Why is CRISPR-Cas9 model a good model? Such questions have fuelled a vivid debate, in particular around Craver's work (Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2005] ; Craver [2006] , [2007] ; Kaplan and Craver [2011] ; Levy and Bechtel [2013] ; Levy [2014] ).
First, successful mechanistic explanations describe the causal structure of the world, namely how a phenomenon is constitutively produced and/or maintained by causally relevant components. In Craver's work (but in (Bechtel and Richardson [2010]) as well), causal relevance and explanation are intimately connected, and the idea of 'control' plays a pivotal role. Craver draws extensively from Woodward's account of causation ([2003] ), in the sense that causal relationships can be identified by the fact that they are 'potentially exploitable for the purpose of manipulation and control' (Craver [2007] , p. 94). For this reason, the account is related to the idea of 'intervention', defined as a manipulation that changes the value of a variable 1 . To simplify, X is causally relevant to Y if we can manipulate Y in conditions W by manipulating X 2 . Entities described in the CRISPR-Cas9 model are causally relevant to bacterial immunity in this sense.
Next, according to Craver ([2006] ; [2007] ), a mechanistic model is accurate (it explains) when the description of the causal structure of a phenomenon is not just a mere conjecture of how that phenomenon could be produced. It must involve a description of a causal structure involving real components and real activities. When I say 'real' I mean that they have to correspond to entities in the world causally relevant to the phenomenon (Kaplan and Craver [2011] Craver's claims of completeness of explanations have attracted criticisms (Levy and Bechtel [2013] ; Levy [2014] In molecular biology (and specifically cell biology or molecular genetics), the issue of completeness and abstraction is not as problematic. Typical molecular biologists (such as cell biologists) focus on the components and activities that make a difference or that they are causally relevant in a specific context (Love and Nathan [2015] ). This can be done by emphasizing the aspects relating the notions of 'intervention' and causal relevance as stressed by Craver ([2007] ) or analogously by other authors (see (Strevens [2008] )). But unlike in neuroscience, in disciplines as cell biology or molecular genetics depicting precisely the properties of (causally relevant) components is often very important. Abstracting from irrelevant details and having in mind Craver's discussions about the importance of details for 'model of' should not be understood as in tension, because completeness would apply only to the causally relevant components.
'Models for': The case of CRISPR-Cas9
Let us consider again the model of the CRISPR-Cas system (Figure 1 for' is any biological context where the interventionist strategies they suggest can be useful.
When I say that components of CRISPR-Cas9 model have been resituated in another context, I mean that a single RNA-guided Cas9 that can cleave specific targeted DNA sequence has been 'redirected' for programmed DNA cleavage (Jinek et al [2012] ).
Such a single RNA-guided Cas9 does in other contexts the same thing that it does in the context of bacterial immunity, but it does this with different purposes (it does not contribute to bacterial immunity), where 'purposes' are specified by those who exploit its capacities. Unlike in mechanistic 'models of', interventionist strategies must be actual and they are strictly related to human agency.
The same model can be used both to represent/explain and as a guide to manipulate experimental systems in multiple contexts. In other words, it is the same model but considered according to different desiderata and aims. In other words, instead of looking at models to establish if they explain, we look at models to find something that can be repurposed elsewhere. The components of the model are used with different purposes in mind; when models are considered 'models of', components are considered as parts of an explanation, unlike in models as 'models for' where components are seen as potentially triggering specific effects in other contexts.
Importance of 'models for'
Models like CRISPR-Cas9 -as 'models for'-play a prominent role in molecular biology. Biologists, by reasoning on them, develop new ways of manipulating biological entities, which are then used to investigate phenomena that were at first inaccessible. The history of molecular biology is replete with such examples. For instance, the model of reverse transcriptase in 1970 (Temin and Mizutani [1970] ) has been used to develop tools for gene cloning. As Morange puts it, 'its discovery […] in fact provided one of the most important tools of genetic engineering' ([1998] , p. 172). Another important example is DNA polymerase which was characterized by Arthur Kornberg in 1955, and then it has been 'repurposed' in many ways, which will be exposed in detail below.
These examples are related to the importance of experiments in molecular biology. In several cases, strategies of discovery in science have been characterized by philosophers of science as (cognitive) strategies for discovering mechanisms (Bechtel and Richardson [2010] ). When it comes to molecular biology, these strategies are instantiated mostly in terms of experiments. For instance, to localize causally relevant biological entities in a phenomenon, we need to materially stimulate or inhibit the phenomenon itself (Bechtel and Richardson [2010] ; see also interlevel experiments in (Craver [2007] )). The ideas on intervention and causal relevance elaborated by Woodward (2003) and developed by Craver ([2007] ) may apply here, though not completely. In molecular biology what count are only actual manipulations and interventions, and not also 'ideal'
interventions. The importance of experiments is that they actually (and not possibly)
provide a material access into biological systems; only by interpreting the responses of such systems, do we elaborate a mechanistic description of how the system works. As just mentioned, in the history of molecular biology (Rheinberger [2007] ; Morange [1998] ), models have been exploited to elaborate more precise and effective ways of materially manipulating biological phenomena 4 . These in turn could lead in principle to the elaboration of more precise mechanistic models. 'Models for' are the engine of progress in molecular biology, because they facilitate the possibility of more precise experimental manipulations, which are a prominent means for elaborating explanations.
'Models for' and philosophy of experimentation in biology
Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the characteristics of 'models for', let me now distinguish my interest in this aspect of models from seemingly similar analyses.
Consider for instance the notion of 'build-it test' developed by Craver and Darden. In ( focus is on how mechanistic models can be used to elaborate manipulative/interventionist strategies that are applied to contexts (in the sense meant above) that are different from the specific context for which the model -as a 'model of'-is considered relevant. The important aspect of the CRISPR-Cas model is that we do not use its specific 'DNAcutting' workflow (in the sense of 'procedure') to reproduce a phenomenon in order to understand if we have a good explanation of it (like in the 'build.it' test), but rather we want to use the workflow to manipulate other phenomena.
The same applies to scholarships focused on the experimental nature of molecular biology. For instance, Weber's Philosophy of Experimental Biology ([2005] ) is centred on issues that "concern the ways in which scientific knowledge is structured, how it explains natural phenomena, how it is generated and evaluated, and how it connects to the world" (Weber [2005] , p. 5). As in the 'build-it' test, the interest is directly in epistemic issues. Surely, 'models for' are important tools to devise experimental strategies which in turn will be used to explain other phenomena. But models as 'models for' are not interesting because they answer directly to epistemic problems. Rather, they inspire interventionist strategies that, per se, are not intended to show the causal relevance of the components of the model involved. While for some scholars successful and robust experimental use of entities (Hacking [1983] ) are intended to show that certain entities exist 5 and/or they are causally relevant, seeing models as 'models for' assumes that the components of the model are real.
Moreover, one may connect the idea of 'models for' to the rich discussion made by Rheinberger about experimental systems (understood as the phenomenon to explain and the material tools to constrain it) and practices of molecular biology (Rheinberger [1997a (Rheinberger [ ], [1997b ). Biologists reduce the epistemic complexity of biological phenomena (the fact that they have limited access to the phenomenon itself) by constraining and manipulating systems (both conceptually and materially) in various ways. For this reason,
Rheinberger focuses his research on the details of epistemic and experimental practices.
He also emphasizes different ways in which experimental systems may be combined.
This sounds similar to the idea of 'models for', in the sense that we combine pieces of different models (or experimental systems, even though they are not exactly the same 
'Models for' and the Discovery of Restriction-modification Systems
The characteristics of good 'models for' will be further investigated by reconstructing an important episode of the history of biology. This is the characterization of restrictionmodification systems of bacteria and their exploitation for developing various techniques widely used in molecular biology, (like DNA cloning and mapping). This particular episode shows very well how the scientists' interest can shift to different aspects ('model of' and 'model for') of the same model.
A tale of three Nobel Laureates
The 'restriction-modification system' (RM-system) is a mechanism of defence of bacteria used against bacteriophages 6 (a virus infecting and replicating in bacteria). Such a mechanism of defence works as follows (see Figure 2) . First, a bacteriophage invades a bacterium (from now on, the host cell). Once this happens, the host cell stimulates the Yet, Arber and Smith on the one hand, and Nathans on the other were awarded the prize for different reasons, which in part reflect the distinction between 'models of' and 'models for'.
6 Bacteriophages are viruses infecting and replicating in bacteria 7 There are at least five types of restriction enzymes. The most relevant here are Type II because they are the most commonly exploited
The origin of the discovery of RM-systems lies in some studies in the 1950s
showing that bacteriophages grown on one strain of bacteria could not grow similarly in others (Roberts [2005] , p. 5905). At first, this seemed to suggest that "the efficiency with which phage infected new bacterial hosts depended on the host on which they previously grew" (Loenen et al [2014] , p. 4). Therefore, the hypothesis was that certain abilities of bacteriophages -acquired by means of an unknown mechanism-created this difference.
Later, Arber accumulated enough evidence to support the idea that host cells were responsible for the curious phenomenon. Arber's lab proposed a new model to fully account for the mysterious phenomenon. He hypothesized that bacteria cells must contain two specific types of enzymes. The first (later identified as an endonuclease) has the function of cleaving specific sequences of DNA. The second (later identified as a methyltransferase) recognizes and modifies the same specific sequence on the host DNA preventing its destruction by the restriction enzyme (Arber [1965] ) 8 . Arber proposed this mechanism as a sketch rather than a schema or as a how-plausibly/actually model because the two enzymes were only later isolated. Therefore, Arber's model is not a case of abstraction, because he failed to identify relevant components. If Arber had just elaborated a sketch, it is not clear why he was awarded the prize in the first place. The Nobel Academy said it was both for the discovery of restriction enzymes and because he 'postulated that these enzymes bind to DNA at specific sites containing recurring structural elements made up of specific base-pair sequences […] He proposed that DNA molecules contain specific sites with the capacity to bind both types of enzymes' 9 .
However, this is imprecise. While he postulated the existence of restriction enzymes, he discovered in 1968 a specific restriction enzyme (called EcoBI) that is not sequencespecific. This was in a sense a self-defeating discovery, because at first he postulated the existence of a specific type of entity with specific features, but later that entity turned out to have different properties. Therefore, the main reason why Arber was awarded was because he 'had provided the theoretical framework that described the biology of restriction and modification' (Roberts [2005] , p. 5907). Since in 1978 The Nobel Academy decided to award the prize 'for discoveries with far reaching consequences for genetics' 10 , despite the black boxes in Arber's model the importance of this work was apparent.
Hamilton Smith won the prize as well. Smith (Smith and Wilcox [1970] (Weinberg [1985] ).
RM-system model as a 'model for' and a 'model of'
Arber's model, understood as a 'model for', has been repurposed in a different biological context in order to manipulate other biological entities. Which are the features of RMsystem model that made it a successful 'model for'?
The model of RM-systems was conceived and treated as a 'model of' both by Arber and Smith. Starting from Arber's sketch, biologists tried progressively to complete it in a way that could make sense of the phenomenon observed. As I have already noticed, the philosophical literature has a list of criteria that mechanistic modelsconceived as 'models of'-should met to be good models. Let us see whether some of these virtues were embedded by Arber's model and whether they can explain why this model was successful as a 'model for'.
It seems to me that Arber's model originally was a paradigmatic case of an incomplete how-possibly model because the two most important entities (the restriction enzyme and the modification enzyme) were merely hypothesized. This is not abstraction, since the enzymes were causally relevant in Arber's interpretation of the phenomenon.
Moreover, Arber speculated that restriction and modification enzymes had to be sequence-specific but the first restriction enzyme he isolated was not sequence-specific.
Even when Smith isolated the sequence-specific endonuclease R, Arber's model remained largely incomplete, since evidence of the first 'modification' enzyme was reported only in 1972. To use mechanistic jargon, in 1971 -when Nathans exploited RM-system model-the RM-system model was just a mechanism sketch; it could not fully account for the phenomenon and most of its entities and activities were merely hypothesized. The idea, for instance, of the 3M constraint and in general the fact that entities and activities must be real is not met. Hypothesized components are understood as being causally relevant, but establishing causal relevance requires that such components should be more than fictional. The only aspect that Arber (and Smith as well) correctly spelled out was the organization (understood as causal connectivity) between the hypothesized key entities. However, understanding correctly the organization is not enough for a mechanistic model to be adequate and hence good 'models of' and 'models for' do not share necessarily the same features.
Epistemic Disposition and Disposition Towards Affordances
Let me now turn again to the fact that the model is treated both as a disposition' I mean a tendency to look at and reason over things through a particular lens or from a specific angle. By 'reasoning over' I mean that these dispositions somehow prescribe the criteria employed to analyse and appraise whatever is under scrutiny.
Two cognitive dispositions towards models
Smith treated Arber's model as a 'model of', and in that respect he aimed to complete the model by identifying specific enzymes postulated in the model. If we treat the model as a model of a biological phenomenon, then we look for specific features of the model and not others. I call the cognitive disposition of looking at models as models of phenomena 'epistemic disposition' because it focuses scientists' attention to matters of explanatory force or representational adequacy of a model with respect to the target system. Because of this disposition, the biologist will only ask specific questions such as "Does this model (Brownlee [2005] ). This is looking at Arber's model as something to be 'repurposed' in another context. In particular, Nathans and one of his students assayed 'the activity on SV40 DNA of various restriction enzymes' (Schlesinger [1979] ).
Therefore, the appeal to cognitive dispositions is supported by Nathans' account of the episode since it is Nathans' aims and intentions that had him to treat the model as a 'model for' and not necessarily some features of the model itself.
To qualify this further, Nathans looked at Arber's model from the standpoint of what I call a disposition towards affordances 15 . The idea of 'affordance' comes from psychology. It has been introduced by James Gibson and later popularized in the context of Human-Machine Interaction by Norman ([1999] ). Though there is an evolution of the concept, here I will use just the basic meaning of the concept of affordance. An affordance is a property of an object that suggests how to interact with or use that object.
While for Gibson 'affordances' exist independently of the observer, the fact that they can be 'exploited' depends on the actor interacting with the environment. Models, when 14 See in particular Schlesinger's interview to Nathans in 1979 at http://beckerexhibits.wustl.edu/oral/transcripts/nathans.html 15 By drawing a distinction between the two different cognitive dispositions, I do not mean to say a biologist in his/her life cultivates either the one or the other. Actually, molecular biology curricula emphasize both aspects considered as 'models for', may afford experimental strategies, but the fact that one can see them depends on whether she has the right disposition towards the model. In molecular biology, it is common to look for affordances in mechanistic models to solve experimental problems in a different context. Therefore, Nathans 'imagined' a component of Arber's model in a different biological context serving a different purpose than in the original context, namely to solve the problem of how to reduce the length of DNA strands in a controlled way. Through this disposition towards affordances, a scientist is not interested in whether a model accurately explains a phenomenon. Rather, this disposition sets scientists' focus on how we can use a part of a model to solve a problem raised in another context. It is important to stress this idea once more; it is up to human agency whether to treat a model as a 'model for' because nothing in the model per se discriminates between 'model of' and 'model for' (even though there are models that are better 'equipped' to be 'models for' or 'models of'). As I said, 'models of' and 'models for' are not two types of models, but rather aspects of the same model. It is in light of scientists' aims and interests that a model is treated in a way or another and the scientist can go back and forth depending on her interests and intentions. Moreover, we need the appeal to cognitive dispositions and intentions in order to make sense of the fact that resituating a model in a specific context rather than another is a function, again, of scientists' interests and intentions.
Intentions in philosophy of science and studies of scientific cognition
The appeal to (cognitive) dispositions or intentions and the inclusion of the agent in the equation of modelling are hardly new things (Giere [2004] ; Van Fraassen [2008] ).
However, my impression is that some philosophers of science have for the most part only invoked -rather than analysed in detail-the role of agents and intentions.
For instance, Giere ([2004] , [2010] ) focuses on the activity of representing. He says that the mere focus on the representation and the target system is not enough, because the activity is done by agents; '[s]ince scientists are intentional agents with goals and purposes, I propose explicitly to provide a space for purposes in my understanding of representational practices in science' (Giere [2004] , p. 743). His attention is on the purpose of learning something from models, and how models represent reality. My analysis differs from Giere's in at least two respects. First, I provide a 'taxonomy' (though preliminary) of different types of 'intentions' within a specific scientific field. I
show precisely how specific intentions/dispositions can make sense of different practices within the same discipline. Moreover, unlike in Giere's account, here I am not interested in explaining how models represent and how similarity should be understood, but rather in why and how mechanistic models are used in different ways.
Intentions and purposes make one important appearance in Weisberg's discussion of similarity ([2013] ) as well. When one has to establish which features should be considered to measure similarity between a model and the target system, Weisberg says that we should make explicit the modeler's 'intended scope'. This is a mixture of intentions, purposes (such as research goals) and background theory. Weisberg's discussion of purposes is rich, and it is spelled out in terms of 'representational ideals', namely those goals governing modeling. However, intentions play only an indirect role, and in my understanding they are invoked to make sense of the claim that scientists choose among ideals. Here I am more explicit about the specific contribution of dispositions and intentions. Moreover, the intended scope and fidelity criteria Weisberg I should also emphasize that studies of scientific cognitions can in principle shed light on some of the cognitive dynamics of 'models of' and 'models for' (Nersessian [2002] ). First, studies on scientific cognition are grounded in a problem-solving framework. Philosophical studies in molecular biology (Bechtel and Richardson [2010] )
assume that problem-solving is a fundamental way biologists reason. Next, I have interpreted Nathans' narrative of his work (but Kary Mullis' account of PCR might be interpreted similarly) as embedded in the 'mental modelling' framework (Nersessian [2002] ). Mental modelling based on the idea that 'in many instances people reason by carrying out thought experiments on internal models' (Nersessian [2002] , p 139), and this is especially true for reasoning about causality in physical systems. It seems that when biologists treat models as 'models for' and they abstract components of a model and imagine them in another context, they exhibit several types of mental modelling types listed in cognitive science literature, such as analogical, visual and simulative modelling.
Finally, studies of scientific cognition in biomedical engineering in particular (see for instance (MacLeod and Nersessian [2013] )) have shown how scientists abstract and combine pieces of models to create new epistemic or material tools.
Virtues of 'Models for'
Being a good 'model for' does not necessarily require Craver's epistemic virtues.
However, this is just a negative characterization. Which are exactly the virtues of good 'models for'? Here I sketch a preliminary taxonomy of such virtues. Since I have emphasized that the unit of analysis is not only the model and the target system, but that also the modeler plays a role, I first establish that there are two categories of virtues for 'models for'. First, there are virtues of models connecting the model to its target system, and next there are virtues connecting the model to the modeler.
'Models for', target systems and portability
In the case of 'models of', the target system is the phenomenon we want to explain. In the case of 'models for', the target system is the set of experimental systems where the dynamics described by the model can be successfully implemented.
When 'models for' and their target systems are concerned, an important virtue is what Floridi calls 'portability' ([2011] ; but see also (Leonelli [2015] In order for a model to be portable, there are a few requirements that should be met. First, portability does not apply to the model considered as a whole. In fact, only a few components will do, but it is the entire model that is a model 'for' because the biologists think about resituating components by reasoning on the model as a whole, and by abstracting something from it. A consequence of this is that the components that we want to resituate must be real. The whole model does not need to be complete or howactually, but specific components should be clearly identified. As I mentioned above, entity realism (in the sense of components of the model corresponding to real entities in the world) in 'models for' is not the aim, but it is an assumption. We do not manipulate entities for the purpose of showing that they are real, but we use such entities in another context under the assumption that they are real. Nathans was not in the position to treat Arber's model as a 'model for' until Smith filled a black-box in Arber's model with the 16 Floridi's context is the evaluation of ontologies. A portable ontology is one that could be made 'run' in many possible worlds. 17 Something akin to portability may work also for 'model of', though it has a different function, and it has a different name. A 'models of' is highly portable if it can capture the dynamics of several target systems. This has been called 'schema', and portability in such a context has been also named generality, namely "the number of […] target a particular model applies to" (Weisberg [2013] Mullis' work. To generalize this point, the important thing about 'resituating' is to be able to control the activity of a component in a novel context.
How-possibly models and schemas
Affordances suggested by models may be difficult to see. However, sometimes models have some characteristics that facilitate the detection of affordances. These characteristics, though not necessary for good 'models for', are helpful to modelers.
One of these is being a how-possibly model, strange as this may sound since the received view is that being 'how-possibly' is actually a deficiency of models 20 (Craver and Darden [2013] ). However, a 'how-actually' model is so replete with details that is very difficult for the biologist to mentally abstract some of its parts and to resituate them in other contexts. Therefore, a 'how-possibly' model affords better (if, of course, it is 19 It should be noted that PCR uses a special kind of DNA polymerase 20 Again, the way I understand here how-possibly models is not related to abstraction (Levy and Bechtel [2013] ; Levy [2014] whether the model is a good 'model for' will depend on portability, and whether a model is portable will depend on the nature of the components of the model.
Something similar may be said about 'schemas' (understood as abstract descriptions of mechanisms that can apply across several contexts). The case of schemas make even more sense if we look at the literature on how scientific knowledge is transferred from one context to another. For instance, Morgan ([2014] ) describes several ways of 'resituating knowledge' to different contexts. In particular, when resituating is from local-to-many, modelers have first to desituate 'local findings into a somewhat broader level (above local but less than general), which can then be available for resituation in another local level' (Morgan [2014] , p. 1014). To see whether something can work in a different context, we have to abstract or decontextualize it from its local context; at a more general level pieces of mechanistic models are less constrained by the locality of the models themselves.
Conclusion
Sometimes molecular biologists exploit knowledge of phenomena for experimental purposes. In this contribution, I tried to make sense of this by developing Keller's distinction between 'models of' and 'models for'. 'Models of (phenomena)' should be understood as models representing phenomena, while 'models for (manipulating phenomena)' are models that suggest new types of material manipulations and experimental strategies. The aim of the article was to identify the differences between 'model of' and 'model for' and in particular to provide a preliminary characterization of the characteristics that make a model a good 'model for'. However, a study combining the perspectives of philosophy of science in practice, studies of scientific cognition and history of molecular biology will be fundamental to enrich the picture I proposed.
By analyzing the history of the characterization of restriction-modification systems, I claimed that whether a model is treated as a 'model of' or a 'model for' will depend on a scientist's cognitive dispositions towards the model. A modeler will look at a model in the sense of a 'model of' if he/she is interested in the explanatory force of the model (epistemic disposition), or as a 'model for' if the interest lies on model's affordances for manipulative strategies (disposition towards affordances). Such dispositions 'prescribe' the way the model would be treated and evaluated.
While virtues of models as 'models of' in molecular biology have been extensively characterized, the characterization of models from the standpoint of the disposition towards affordances has been elusive. For this reason, in the last section I have identified an important virtue of 'models for'. This is called portability, namely the ease with which components of mechanistic models could be used and combined to solve problems in a different experimental system. Finally, I have also noticed that if a model is a 'how-possibly' model or a schema, then it is easier to resituate elsewhere, though under the assumption that it is portable.
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